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Investigates the influence of society, harmonization and market orientation on the level of 
non-mandatory disclosures in a developing country context - Fiji.  
Design/methodology/approach  
Theoretically, this paper uses legitimacy theory. A content analysis of the non- mandatory 
disclosures of the 15 listed public companies in Fiji was undertaken.    
Findings 
Findings indicate that outright adoption of International Accounting Standards (IASs) by 
Fijian public limited companies does not engender in adequate disclosure of information on a 
non-mandatory basis.  This is largely ascribed to the differing cultural values of societies and 
monopolistic characteristics of markets in Fiji that discourage individuals to exercise 
judgement. Further, findings suggest that the influence of society, market concentration and 
harmonisation of accounting standards has not rendered increased disclosure of non- 
mandatory information than those considered mandatory by the subject listed companies. 
Research limitations/implications 
While the methods utilised delivered a great deal of useful quantitative data, it must be 
remembered that the results were based on 15 listed companies in Fiji’s Stock Exchange. 
Further studies using similar variables to this one from other developing countries would 
provide understanding of the extent to which these results are generalisable across other 
developing countries and industries. 
Practical implications 
Results provide a resource for individuals, organisations and policy makers attempting to 
explicate or understand what induces particular entities to voluntarily disclose non- 
mandatory information in their annual report.   
Original/value of paper 
Adds to our understanding of non- mandatory disclosure and therefore represents a 
substantial addition to, and extension of, the international literature engaged in efforts to 
interpret the motives for such disclosure. 
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Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing pressure on companies to be responsible for their 
actions to the greater society (see Brown & Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998; Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989; Cromier & Gordon, 2001; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000).  This engenders 
businesses to operate in socially and environmentally responsible manner (Spiller, 2000; 
Brown & Deegan, 1998).  The most common vehicle available for companies to 
communicate social and environment obligation is their annual financial reports   (Brown & 
Deegan, 1998; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990).  However, there is the suggestion that such social 
and environmental reporting has remained predominantly a voluntary practice (see 
Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). 
This paper presents the results of a study that investigates three inter- related issues, 
the influence of society, harmonization, and market orientation, on the level of non- 
mandatory disclosures.  Society concerns may be expected to influence the level of non- 
mandatory disclosure (Neu et al., 1998).  This may also entail the culture of society.   
Developing countries are perceived to have a slightly different culture than those that persist 
in the developed world (Hofstede, 1980).  Parallel to this, the general public are increasingly 
becoming aware of environmental disclosures.  Harmonisation, for the purpose of this study, 
refers to the adoption of International Accounting Standards (IASs) as a basis for bringing 
consistency to financial statements across nations.  Within the process of harmonisation, local 
regulating bodies are increasingly acceding to the international pressure, which they can no 
longer resist.  This research is an attempt to demonstrate that outright adoption of IASs lead 
to less disclosure of information on a non-mandatory basis using the listed companies on 
Fiji’s Stock Exchange, which almost exclusively use the IASs.    The market orientation, on 
the other hand, is based on the level of market concentration.  Market concentration is the 
market share of the firm in the industry.   
Companies are required to disclose mandatory information in their annual reports as 
per requirements of various regulations (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998). It is, 
however, likely that mandatory reporting will not engender disclosure of all information 
perceived to be important.  Information pertaining to an entity's interaction with environment, 
employee policies, and land use and waste management programmes is imperative to varied 
stakeholders.   It is, therefore, in the interest of the society that the reporting entities disclose 
other necessary information on a voluntary basis.  Voluntary information is largely required 
in terms of how an entity interacts with the organisation and society as a whole. 
Social and environmental reporting is not compulsory under the Fijian Companies 
Act, 1983 and the Fiji Accounting Standards (FASs).  Paragraph 2 of the FASs 5, however, 
states that: 
“users cannot make reliable judgements unless the financial statements are clear and 
understandable.  The information needed for these purposes will therefore often 
extend beyond the minimum necessary to meet the requirements of Companies Act.” 
 
Paragraph 6 further states that: 
“all material information should be disclosed that is necessary to make the financial  
statements clear and understandable.” 
 
This demonstrates that the only relevant information is not those that are specifically 
required under mandated accounting standards and other regulatory and professional 
requirements.  The decision to disclose relevant information is upon the discretion of 
companies.  Companies are likely to consider the costs and benefits of disclosing 
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disclosed and information with negative implications would not be disclosed (Gray et. al, 
1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975 and Lindblom, 1994). This, 
however, would largely hold true in developed countries with an efficient capital market. 
Developing Countries’ accounting system is deficient in the context that they have a weak 
capital and financial market (Wallace, 1990).  Business elites and institutional shareholders 
are dominant stakeholders in Fiji’s Capital Market and the individuals hardly participate in 
the stock market.  Trading on the stock market in Fiji is limited to three days of a week: 
Monday, Tuesday and Thursdays, and on some days no trades are executed apparently 
stemming from weak capital market. 
For the purpose of this study, the term disclosure refers to the communication of 
economic information of a business entity, whether financial or non-financial, qualitative or 
otherwise. Information is non-mandatory if companies are not obliged under a disclosure-
regulating regime to disclose insofar as they are applicable to them.  Further, the disclosure of 
mandated information is in the minimum standard of disclosure that reporting bodies in Fiji 
expect.  Hence, other disclosure is considered as non-mandatory. 
Research on non- mandatory disclosures in developing countries is limited.  This 
paper is motivated by this lack of research and focuses on whether legitimacy theory offers 
an explanation on the three inter- related issues stated above. The study adds to our 
understanding of non- mandatory disclosure and therefore represents a substantial addition to, 
and extension of, the international literature engaged in efforts to interpret the motives for 
such disclosure. 
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. We firstly consider the financial 
reporting environment in Fiji followed by previous non- mandatory disclosure research.  We 
also describe legitimacy theory that is relied upon within this study.  An overview of the 
research methods is then provided, followed by a discussion of the results.  The final section 
addresses the findings and implications of the study. 
 
The financial reporting environment in Fiji 
Fiji is a developing economy with a parliamentary system of Government. It has a free capital 
market; however the market operates in a blocked shareholding environment. While the 
proportion of institutional and individual shareholders differ within listed companies, on 
average, about 80% of the shares on the publicly listed companies are held by institutional 
shareholders (SPSE, 2004) including the Government. These shares are rarely traded and if 
any trading does take place it may be between these institutional shareholders. The individual 
shareholders have a minimal influence on the countries capital market (Patel, 2002). The 
industry is dominated by the primary sector, majority at a semi-subsistence level.  The capital 
market regulator; the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) was formed in 1996 
through the CMDA Act 1996 and facilitates the trading of shares through the South Pacific 
Stock Exchange (SPSE) (CMDA, 2004). 
The CMDA records and releases current trading data on equities and bonds traded 
during SPSE call market sessions.  At present only selected number of securities are issued 
and traded. These are shares, government and statutory authority bonds, government treasury 
bills, statutory authority promissory notes, corporate bonds, Reserve Bank of Fiji notes 
(issued for monetary policy purposes) and tradable term deposits. 
The financial reporting framework in Fiji is articulated in the Companies Act (Fiji) 
1983. Further requirements are vested in terms of pronouncements by the country’s sole 
professional accounting body - the Fiji Institute of Accountants (FIA).  The FIA was 
established in 1972 through the FIA Act (Fiji Institute of Accountants, 2002).  Prior to this, 
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reporting framework.   
The accounting and auditing standards committee of the FIA has the responsibility of 
promulgating accounting standards. These standards primarily are the same if not identical to 
the IASs. The FIA has 30 mandatory accounting standards - IAS 1 to 31 except IAS 12.  
Further, IAS 12 and IAS 32 to 39 are guidance standards with full adoption date set for 2005.  
This means, by 2005, Fijian companies would be complying with all the applicable IASs.   
The stakeholders’ justification for full harmonisation of accounting standards is 
induced by the trend of globalisation that facilitates comparability across national boundaries 
and saves the cost of preparing standards (Chand, 2005). The multinational interests are 
common in Fiji. It is a means of attracting foreign investment and assistance as well.   
Consultants from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were also an impetus to the adoption 
of harmonised standards (Chand, 2005). As such, ADB loans would probably be quickly 
available if developing countries like Fiji consider adopting IASs.  The next section considers 
the prior studies on non- mandatory disclosure. 
 
Previous research 
Non-mandatory reporting largely deals with social and environmental reporting.   
Environmental reporting was initially studied as part of greater social reporting.  Studies in 
developed countries indicate that non-mandatory reporting in terms of environmental 
reporting has increased in the last fourteen years (Harte and Owen, 1991; Patten, 1992; 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Gamble et. al 1996; Niskala and Pretes 
1995; Gray et. al., 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; O’Donovan and Gibson, 2000; Tsang, 
1998 and Cormier and Magnan, 2003).  Milne and Patten (2002) report that companies were 
also increasing the provision of more positive environmental information in their financial 
reports.  The additional disclosures were being used by corporations as a tool for increasing 
their social legitimacy (Milne and Patten, 2002). 
Non-mandatory disclosure of information may depend upon the organisation’s 
willingness to communicate that information. Dye (1985) and Verrecchia (1983) argue that 
managers may withhold information even if, in theory, it is desirable to disclose private 
information. Cormier and Magnan (2003) study looked at whether non-mandatory 
environmental information is related to information cost to be incurred by the firm and 
investors. Their results show that non-mandatory disclosure of environmental information by 
a firm can be influenced by the potential costs of reporting such information. Li et al.’s 
(1997) findings are also consistent with those of Cormier and Magnan (2003) when they 
examine the risk of sanctions following particular environmental incidents. Barth et al.   
(1997) focus on how firms disclose their environmental debts on a non-mandatory basis.  
They observe that when several parties are held potentially responsible for a site that is 
contaminated according to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), thus increasing external 
groups; concerns about the extent of withheld information, firms are less likely to voluntarily 
reveal that their environmental debts are lower than five percent of total debt.
1 Their results 
support explanations advanced by Dye (1985) and Verrecchia (1983). The above studies 
adopted an information economics perspective.  
Recently several studies explored non-mandatory disclosure of information  from a 
legitimacy theory perspective (Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002; Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Patten, 1991; 1992; Gray et. al., 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Gamble et al.,1996; Lemon and Cahan, 1997; Walden and Schwartz, 1997; 
Brown and Deegan, 1998; Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998; Savage, Rowlands and Cataldo, 
                                                 
1 Under Securities and Exchange Commission requirements, firms must disclose environmental information on the 10-K 
report if they exceed 5% of their total debts. 
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that since firms operate in a socio-political context, they legitimise their environmental 
management and avoid sanctions through voluntary environmental disclosure.  
Findings from studies that rely on legitimacy theory, however, are mixed (Hogner, 
1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Gray et. al., 1995; Savage, Rowlands and Cataldo, 1999; 
Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002). Furthermore, findings from 
several studies that supposedly provide support for legitimacy theory can be interpreted 
through information economics lens since the meaning of some explanatory variables is 
debatable (e.g. Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). In other words, variables such as firm size, 
profitability or leverage can serve as proxies for legitimacy as well as for economics 
concerns. It is the case for studies like Patten (1991, 1992), Deegan and Rankin (1996), 
Deegan and Gordon (1996), Brown and Deegan (1998), Walden and Schwartz (1997), 
Cormier and Gordon (2001) and Cormier and Magnan (2003).  
As identified by Pattern (1991, 1992) and Cormier and Gordon (2001), non-
mandatory disclosure is related to firms and industry membership. Most of the industries in 
developing countries operate in a monopolistic environment. Some industries just have one 
player. It is, however, pertinent to mention that despite the monopolistic environment, firms 
would be obliged to disclose information on a voluntary basis if subject to political pressure 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). To counter such pressure, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
suggest that:  
‘…corporations employ a number of devices, such as social responsibility campaign 
in the media, government lobbying and selection of accounting procedures to 
minimise reported earnings. By avoiding the attention that “high” profits draw 
because of the public’s association of high reported profits and monopoly rents, 
management can reduce their likelihood of adverse political action and thereby, 
reduce its expected costs’. [p. 115] 
 
It is their potential abuse of monopoly power that lies in the heart of Watts and 
Zimmerman’s notion of political cost. The need to provide information on a voluntary basis 
either to legitimise their activities or to avoid political cost depends a lot on the nature of 
society and political structure of the economy. In developing countries, most of the essential 
service providers who could be subject to political pressure or who need to legitimise their 
actions are statutory organisations. The, pressure, therefore does not exist for them to 
disclose information on a voluntary basis. The same holds for other industries with few 
players. In addition to this, blocked shareholdings, an inefficient capital market and indirect 
involvement with the Government of the day does not encourage entities in developing 
countries to exercise their judgement and disclose any more information than those required 
on a mandatory basis. As such, the nature of the economy in terms of competition and 
political structure in developing economies is likely to contribute to low level of disclosure 
of non-mandatory information. 
Culture also influences the business activities of a nation (Zarzeski, 1996). Zarzeski, 
(1996) specifically revealed that the secretness of a culture underlie disclosure practices of its 
business enterprises.  Studies also show that non-mandatory disclosure pattern is associated 
with national systems of accounting (Muller, 1967; Redebough, 1975; Belkaoui, 1983).   
Culture is a central influence affecting a country’s accounting environment.  The significance 
of culture in explaining behaviour in social systems has been explored in a wide range of 
literature.  Culture has been defined as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the member of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p.25).  An 
essential characteristic of social systems is perceived to be the inclusion of a system of 
societal norms consisting of value systems shared by major groups within a nation (see Choi, 
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others” (Hofstede, 1980, p.19).  Values at the collective level as opposed to the individual 
level represent culture.  Culture describes a system of societal or collectively held values (for 
commentary, see Choi, 2001; Gray, 1988). 
In an effort to develop an acceptable and empirically based terminology to describe 
culture, Hofstede identifies four distinct dimensions, which he considers to be reflective of 
the cultural orientation of a country.  These four dimensions embody individualism versus 
collectivism, large versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance 
and masculinity versus femininity (for detail, see Hofstede, 1980). 
Baskerville (2003), however, postulates that critiques of Hofstede have appeared in 
accounting, but these have not reduced the attractiveness of his indices.  Hofstede’s survey 
apparently was based on one organisation and may not be applicable to other contexts.   
Hofstede utilises equating nation states with cultures.  Cultures do not equate with nations 
(Baskerville, 2003).  Baskerville calls researchers to be wary of indices in cross-national 
studies.  
In his response to Baskerville, Hofstede (2003) argues that Baskerville does not 
realise that there are different paradigms in the social sciences about the meaning of 
“culture”, which engenders varied research approaches.  Although Baskerville comments that 
nations are not the best units for studying cultures, Hofstede (2003) admits that nations are 
the only kind of units available for comparison.  Hofstede questions whether differences 
between nations are not the areas that accounting and business research are usually concerned 
with.  The micro level is the increasing frequency with which others have used and are 
continuing to use Hofstede’s work.  Hofstede notes that if research is competently done and 
replication fails to concur with his findings, then this may be attributed to the reasons of 
statistical, methodological or epistemological. 
Societal and professional cultural values could also have an impact on the level of 
disclosure of information on a non-mandatory basis. Culture is a broad concept that affects a 
wide range of systems. According to Violet (1983), accounting is a socio-technical activity 
that involved interaction between both human and non-human resources. As such, Violet 
(1983) claims that accounting cannot be considered culture-free. According to Gray (1988), a 
methodological framework incorporating culture may be used to explain and predict 
international differences in accounting systems and patterns of accounting development 
internationally. Gray (1988) argues that the value systems of accountants will be derived and 
related to Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions. Gray (1988) developed four accounting 
values (Professionalism verses Statutory Control, Uniformity verses Flexibility, 
Conservatism verses Optimism and Secrecy verses Transparency), which related to the 
accounting subculture and linked the accounting values to Hofstede’s four societal values.  
It is therefore apparent that accounting sub-culture in a particular nation will develop 
a relevant accounting system for that nation (e.g. Zarzeski, 1996).  Whilst it could be argued 
that there should be some form of association between different societal and professional 
value systems, there is a serious doubt of the relevance of a one-size-fits-all accounting 
system. Developing countries have a weak agency relationship. Referring to Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimensions and Gray's (1988) value systems discussed above, developing 
countries have a large power distance.  Stakeholders may not question managers’ actions.  
Managers may only be inclined to report or disclose information required by regulation.  In 
such cases, it is expected that rule based standards would bring about greater transparency 
and increased level of disclosure.   
As mentioned before, many studies on non- mandatory disclosures have relied on 
legitimacy theory perspective (e.g. Brown & Deegan, 1998).  Following previous studies and 
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is discussed next.  
 
Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory posits that organisations seek to ensure that they operate within the bounds 
and norms of their respective societies (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1989; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002).  These bounds and norms 
change across time, requiring the organisations to be also responsive.  Legitimacy has been 
defined by Lindblom (1994, p.2) as: 
‘... a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with 
the value of the larger social system of which the entity is a part.  When a disparity, 
actual or potential, exists between the two systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy’. 
 
Low legitimacy can have direct consequences for an organisation which may 
ultimately lend to the forfeiture of the right to operate (e.g. Tilling, 2004).  Legitimacy theory 
relies on the notion of social contract and on the assumption that managers will adopt 
disclosure strategies that show society that the organisation is attempting to comply with 
society’s expectation (as incorporated within the social contract) (e.g. Deegan et al., 2002; 
O’Donovan, 2002).  The idea of a social contract between business and members of society 
demonstrates that while the main aim of a business may be to make profits, it also has a 
moral obligation to act in a socially responsible manner (see O’Donovan, 2002). 
Brown and Deegan (1998) further report that if an organisation cannot justify its 
continued operation, then the community may revoke its “contract” to continue its operations.  
This may take form such as consumers reducing or eliminating the demand for the business 
products, factor suppliers eliminating the supply of labour and financial capital to the 
business or constituents lobby government for increased fines, taxes or laws to prohibit those 
actions which do not conform to societal expectations (Brown & Deegan, 1998).  The 
business firms therefore needs to disclose sufficient information for society to evaluate 
whether it is a good corporate citizen (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989). 
Non- mandatory reporting may be perceived as reacting to the environment whereby 
they are employed to legitimise firms’ actions.  Deegan (2002) postulates that the public 
disclosure of social and environmental information in media such as annual report is taken for 
legitimising purposes.  The business entity is assumed to be influenced by, and in turn to have 
influence upon, the society in which it functions (Deegan, 2002).  Society, as a collection of 
individuals, renders corporations with their legal standing and the authority to own and use 
natural resources and to hire employees.  Deegan (2002, p.292) reports, ‘organizations draw 
on community resources and output both goods and services and waste products to the 
general environment’.  He further suggests that in order to allow for the organization’s 
existence, society would expect benefits to exceed costs (Deegan, 2002). 
Corporate social disclosure is normally motivated by the corporate need to legitimise 
their activities (Hogner, 1982).  Legitimacy theory espouses that external factors influence 
corporate management to seek to legitimise their activities.  Hence, corporate management 
would react to community expectations.  The stakeholders within a community shape what 
activities, companies, as members of that community should carry out.  These activities 
should be carried out within the boundaries of what is perceived to be acceptable by that 
community.   
Therefore, if some activities have an adverse impact upon the social environment, 
management would seek to re-establish their credentials through the disclosure of additional 
information on a non-mandatory basis (Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000).  However, prior studies 
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and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992 and Deegan and Rankin 1996). 
Non-mandatory reporting can be viewed as a method of responding to the changing 
perceptions of a corporation’s relevant publics (Preston and Post, 1975).  According to 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1994) organisations may legitimise their 
activities through the following ways: 
♦  An organisation can adapt its output, goals and methods of operation to conform to 
prevailing definitions of legitimacy; 
♦  Organisation can attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of social 
legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practice, output and values; 
♦  Organisation can attempt, through communication, to become identified with 
symbols, values or institutions that have a strong base of legitimacy; 
♦  Organisations seek to educate and inform its ‘relevant publics’ about actual changes 
in the organisation’s performance and activities; 
♦  Organisations seek to change the perceptions of the relevant publics – but not change 
its actual behaviour; 
♦  Organisations seek to manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issue of 
concern to other related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols; and 
♦  Organisations seek to change external expectations of its performance. 
These activities, however, would be carried out by entities operating in developed 
countries with efficient capital markets.  This is because the market (stakeholders) would 
punish parties that do not disclose relevant information.   
Legitimacy theory has been in this study utilised to explain the issues of influence of 
society, harmonisation and market orientation on the level of non- mandatory disclosure by 
Fijian corporations.  The extent and type of non- mandatory disclosure in the annual report is 
likely to be related to management’s perception about the concerns of community, from a 
legitimacy perspective. 
 
Research methods  
Sample 
The study consisted of all 15 companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) 
from 1999 to 2003.  An analysis of the non- mandatory disclosures of the public companies 
in Fiji was undertaken as it was perceived that the accessibility of information for public 
companies is much easier than those for private companies.  As public companies are listed 
on the Stock Exchange, reasonable information on these companies are available in the public 
domain (e.g. Lodhia, 2000). The cut-off date was set at 31
st March 2003 to ensure that 
companies were able to supply annual reports for the full 12 months of the 4 years from 1999 
to 2003. The industries involved are food and household, beverage, insurance, 
telecommunications, transport, manufacturing, timber and natural resources. The annual 
reports of these companies were gathered from the University of the South Pacific (USP) 
Library and the South Pacific Stock Exchange Library.  
The assessment of non-mandatory disclosure by reporting entities in Fiji meant 
looking at the reports of the executives in the organisation such as the Chairman’s Report and 
the Chief Executive Officers Report. The private companies are excluded from this report, as 
they are not obliged to disclose financial information to the public.  The reporting entities in 
Fiji entail listed public companies, statutory authorities, public enterprises and multinational 
corporations.  However, stemming from data unavailability, the study restricted the reporting 
entities to only the public companies listed on the SPSE. 
 
Content analysis 
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of information in annual reports of listed companies in Fiji. To do so, it is important to decide 
on what documents to analyse and how to measure the disclosures (Guthrie, 2005).  A key 
assumption of this study in using the content analysis is that quantity of disclosure signifies 
the importance of the item being disclosed (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et. al., 1995; 
Krippendorf, 1980 and Neu et. al., 1998; Guthrie, 2005). 
Annual reports are regarded as important documents in non-mandatory reporting due 
to the high degree of credibility they lend to information reported within them (Tilt, 1994).  
This is ascribed to annual reports being the sole source of certain information and their 
widespread distribution. Thus, the justification in the literature for extensively using annual 
reports in content analysis encompasses these factors (Unerman, 2000).  Further, with non-
annual report data, completeness (Gray et al., 1995) and accessibility (Woodward, 1998) is 
questionable. 
 
Quantification of non-mandatory information 
Measurement of information in annual reports has been discussed in many studies (Gray et. 
al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996 and Milne and Adler, 1998).  There has, however, been 
no uniform method of measurement.  Quantification takes the form of either, the number of 
documents containing a particular category of disclosure and/or the number of characters, 
words, sentences, pages or proportion of pages devoted to different categories (or themes) of 
social disclosure to total disclosure (Unerman, 2000; Brown & Deegan, 1998). 
The use of words has been used by studies to measure the volume and maintaining 
that the volume of disclosure can therefore be recorded in greater detail (Deegan and Gordon, 
1996 Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990).  Measurement of words, however, ignores non-narrative 
disclosures (e.g. Graphs, charts and photographs), which are highly effective method of 
communication (Beattie and Jones, 1994 and Preston & Post, 1975).   
One of the main assumptions behind the use of quantitative content analysis as an 
empirical research tool is that volume of disclosure signifies the importance of disclosure 
(Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray et. al. 1995; Krippendorff, 1980 and Neu et. al., 1998; 
Guthrie, 2005).  It would, therefore, seem to be strange to omit counting the volume of 
disclosure allocating to anything other than words and numbers (Unerman, 2000).  This 
research, therefore, includes the strategy of counting words as a measurement of the extent 
and trend of disclosure of non-mandatory information by listed companies in Fiji.  This 
would avoid inconsistencies in calculating the quantity of disclosure (Zeghal and Ahmed, 
1990) as words is the smallest unit of measurement for analysis. 
 
Measurement of market concentration  
In order to determine whether the monopolistic nature of the industries have an impact on the 
level of non-mandatory disclosure, some test of market concentration is necessary. This study 
uses Herfindahl Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. The Herfindahl Index is a 
simple, yet sophisticated way of measuring industry concentration. The Herfindahl Index is 
obtained by squaring the market-share of the various players, and then summing those 
squares.  For example, consider an industry with two players. Here, the index would be 5,000 
-- the sum of two squares of 50. For a pure monopoly, the index would be 10,000 -- the 
square of 100.  
 
HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + sn^2 (where sn is the market share of the ith firm) 
The Herfindahl Index, for example, helps differentiate between one industry in which 
four players have equal shares and another where one player has 70 per cent share and three 
others 10 per cent each. The former, which is more competitive, would have a lower 
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cent share each, the index would be 1,000. A 1,000-2,000 value generally indicates intense 
competition. The US Anti-Trust Department uses the changes in the Herfindahl Index to 
decide if a merger is anti-competitive or not (Krishnamurthy, 2000).  The Department takes 
the increase in Index value by 100 or any increase in the overall value to over 1,000 
seriously.  
 
Measurement of company size 
Past studies have used a number of indicators to measure company size. This study uses total 
assets as a proxy for company size. 
 
Measurement of financial performance 
This study uses accounting based proxy to measure financial performance. Return on Assets 
is the most popular accounting performance indicator and is frequently used in other studies.  




The results presented in this section show that most of the listed companies take advantage of 
annual report as a tool for communicating information. Most of the listed companies in Fiji 
have some form of non-mandatory disclosure in their annual reports.  There is, however, an 
apparent concern as to the relevance of this information to the respective users. This concern 
is in terms of a firm’s need to legitimise, the competitive nature of the industries and the 
values of the society to whom such information is disclosed.  
It is interesting to note from the results presented in Figure 1 that there was two 
increasing trend of non- mandatory disclosure among the 15 companies studied.  The 
increases, however, were not that significant.  This is consistent, to some extent, with the 
results of Brown and Deegan (1998).  Other companies showed that non- mandatory 
disclosure increased and decreased between period to period with no clear trend being visible.  
One company did not make any non- mandatory disclosure.  This is supported by the fact 
that, according to Gray et. al. (1995) and O’Donnovan and Gibson (2000), reporting 
percentage of such information  is comparatively low compared to companies in developed 
countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom.  As such, this evidence provides 
somewhat inconclusive support for legitimacy theory explanation of non- mandatory 
disclosure.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In considering the trends in the disclosure of non- mandatory information we also 
found that this disclosure ranged from 0 to 14,884 words between 1999- 2003.  This is 
depicted in figure 1.  For the annual report, there is both increasing and decreasing non- 
mandatory disclosure over the period under study with no clear trend being visible.  This 
seems to imply that companies under study report only additional information if they think 
that they are necessary.  This is in line with Gray et al. (1998) argument that information that 
has the potential to increase company value is likely to be disclosed and those with negative 
implications would not be disclosed.   
Table 1 provides location of certain information under different sections in annual 
reports. The majority of the non-mandatory information is provided in the Chairman’s Report 
followed by the Chief Executive Officer’s Report. There is, however, some degree of 
duplication of information in these two reports.  For all industries, the extent of non- 
Page 12 of 25 mandatory disclosure mostly appears in the Chairman’s section of annual report as depicted 
in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Reviewing figure 1, we find the number of words in annual report on non- mandatory 
disclosure decreased for 7 out of 15 companies in 2002/ 2003 period, although the disclosure 
fluctuated in between the 4 year period.  One company showed no non- mandatory disclosure 
between the 4 year periods.  The non- mandatory disclosures tended to increase and decrease 
from period to period with no discernable trends of growth or otherwise being visible.  It 
would be difficult to predict the factors that influenced increase or decrease in non- 
mandatory reporting.  Nevertheless, we presume the collective nature of societies in 
developing countries would indicate that one would not want to disclose information that 
may have negative implications on others.  Whilst figure 1 aggregates various non- 
mandatory disclosures, it shows no clear increasing or decreasing trends on such disclosures 
which have remained voluntary within Fiji.  However, for 2 companies some increases have 
been noted but have not been that significant.  Therefore, a legitimacy theory explanation of 
non- mandatory disclosure seems not to be supported. 
The results also reveal that there is minimal non-mandatory disclosure of information 
about employees even though they are major stakeholders in developing countries
2. Listed 
companies also do not provide information on the use of land.  The results indicate that 
virtually no information is provided to this important stakeholder. Substantial amount of 
industries' operations are located on Native Land, which is within the jurisdiction of the 
traditional landowners. These native landowners are influential in the strategic issues relating 
to the country (Lloyd, 1982).  Hence, they become one of the most important stakeholders in 
developing societies like Fiji.   
The companies studied represented fourteen industries. Out of the fourteen industries, 
5 industries have a Herfindahl Index of 10,000. The activities of these industries, however, 
have huge implications on society. Further, six other industries had the Herfindahl Index 
ranging from 5000 to 8000 with an average Herfindahl Index of 6800. Only 3 industries had 
Herfindahl Index ranging from 1000 to 5000 with an average of Herfindahl Index of 3100. 
These three industries activities, however, have implications on environment and society in 
general. 
The U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal Guidelines Merger indicates an industry 
with a HHI of 1000 or less to be unconcentrated, an industry with a HHI between 1000 and 
1800 to be moderately concentrated and an industry with a HHI of above 1800 to be highly 
concentrated. (Krishnamurthry , 2000). 
Based on this guideline, our results suggest that most industries represented by the 
listed companies are highly concentrated operating in monopoly or near monopoly 
environment. As discussed earlier, political pressure would ensure that firms disclose 
information on a non-mandatory basis to legitimise their activities despite the fact they 
operate in a monopolistic environment. The lack of competition in market and relation that 
entities in developing countries have with the Government of the day, however, means that 
there is no pressure to disclose more information than required on a mandatory basis.  Thus 
legitimacy theory explanation is not supported because of the monopolised markets Fiji is 
exposed to.  However, in such situations, strict rule based standards could ensure greater 
transparency in terms of an entities interaction with society. 
                                                 
2 In most developing countries, there are more employees than shareholders. More disclosure is, therefore, 
expected about employees in companies' annual reports. 
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afford to do this. There seems to be no incentive to legitimise for any activities whether this 
constitutes good or bad news. This, however, does not mean that companies in developing 
countries do not need to legitimise their actions through disclosure of information in addition 
to what is required on a mandatory basis.  
The results also indicate that it is very difficult to tie a particular non-mandatory 
disclosure by a listed company to mandated information as a support tool to better understand 
the information by stakeholders.  Spearman rank- order correlation tests are applied to each 
of the company selected for the study in order to measure the degree of association between 
size of company and the average firm’s non- mandatory disclosure.  The results are provided 
in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows the increasing trend in the proportion of asset ownership by the 7 of 
the 15 companies in these years.  Two companies showed a decreasing trend of asset 
ownership while 6 other companies had recorded increases and decreases in asset ownership 
with no clear trend being visible.  Despite the increase in assets of the 7 companies, there has 
been no discernable increasing or decreasing trend of non- mandatory disclosures by the 
listed companies. In a competitive market, however, increasing operational activities may 
result in companies subject to public attention, whether for good or bad. Firms are expected 
to disclose more information on a non-mandatory basis in order to legitimise such changes in 
operational activities.  This is not the case with the listed companies in Fiji, thus providing 
further evidence of lack of support for legitimacy theory. 
Table 2 provides correlation analysis - coefficient of correlation (r) and coefficient of 
determination (r
2) for the four years under study.  The results indicate positive correlation 
between the level of non-mandatory disclosure and the size of the reporting entity.  In all 
cases the correlation coefficient is in at least in the magnitude of +0.5.  Only 35% of the 
disclosure on average could be explained as a result of the size of the entity. This supports the 
view that companies in developing economies that largely operate in a monopolistic 
environment do not have the desire to report additional information to better understand the 
mandated information or to legitimise their operations (Patel, 2002). Even though some 
bigger companies have provided more non-mandatory information, this could largely be 
attributed to their ability to do so and not as a greater need to legitimise their activities and to 
avoid being under unnecessary political pressure.   Companies report information on a non-
mandatory basis on an ad hoc basis. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 shows that the return on assets has remained relatively stable over the period 
of 1999- 2003 for most companies with some significant increases for 2 firms only.  This has, 
however, not led to any discernable change in trend of disclosures of non- mandatory 
information.  Table 3 provides the results of the relationship between the level of non- 
mandatory disclosure and performance of the reporting entity.  The above table presents the 
results of tests for correlation across each of the four years.  It reaps a correlation coefficient 
of -0.14218 with p<0.05.  This shows that there is almost no relationship between the return 
on investment and the non- mandatory disclosures.  Legitimacy theory, thus, seems to be not 
supported.  The evidence examined in this study has failed to conform legitimacy theory as 
an explanation of non- mandatory disclosure by the Fijian companies. 
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Discussion  
This study examines three inter-related issues of the influences of society, harmonisation and 
market orientation on the level of non- mandatory disclosures to determine if the relationship 
can be explicated within a legitimacy theory framework. Annual reports on non- mandatory 
disclosures are collected for a four year period between 1999 and 2003. 
Legitimacy theory, used within the context of the study, posits that corporate 
management reacts by increasing the level of non- mandatory disclosure if they believe that 
the legitimacy of their organisation/industry is threatened stemming from public concern over 
the environmental implications of the organisation/ industry (see Brown and Deegan, 1998).  
Prior studies (Patten, 1992; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et. al., 2002) provide 
empirical evidence supporting legitimacy theory in terms of a corporate reaction to an event 
influencing a firm’s perceived social responsibility. This study, however, does not support 
these prior studies.  The reason for this is ascribed to the different social and cultural 
environment within which the profession and the entities operate in developing countries (e.g. 
Chow et al., 1999). Further as the results indicate, entities in Fiji operate in a predominantly 
monopolistic environment and do not perceive the need to adhere to ‘social contracts’.  As 
such, there is a lack of incentive for listed companies to disclose information on a non-
mandatory basis especially when required to exercise professional judgement.  A legitimacy 
theory explanation of non- mandatory disclosure could therefore not be supported.  Majority 
of the listed companies operate in a monopolistic environment, that is, they are the sole 
supplier of the products and services. 
On the disclosure of good vs. bad news, studies in developed countries on disclosure 
of good vs. bad news have revealed that companies that perform well are eager to report good 
news (Gray et al., 1998; Guthrie & Parker, 1989).  The results in this study, however, do not 
support those revelations. The average r of -0.14218 shows very weak correlation and an 
average r
2 of 0.036367 show very weak determination. Entities in developing economies are 
not pressured into disclosing more information on a non-mandatory basis by the stakeholders 
hence the lack of need to legitimise their activities.  Blocked shareholding, societal and 
professional values are major factors leading to this. In addition, imposed rules and 
guidelines originating from differing societal and professional values do not improve on the 
situation.  For developing economies, it is important that companies that perform well 
disclose more information.  This is not just to inform the major stakeholders, but also to share 
ideas in true spirit of national development. For development to prosper this is essential, even 
if it has to be through rigid rules in terms of rule based accounting standards 
From a cultural perspective, IASs are developed with the expectation that society 
would call for transparency in financial reporting and due to the small power distance in 
developed countries, managers would be obliged to do so.  This is, however, not the case in 
developing countries. In some societies within the developing countries, broad accountability 
is inappropriate as it would be considered as making an attempt to question the elite's position 
in societies.  In such circumstances, judgement/principle based accounting standards would 
bring about ambiguity in financial reporting. Further, societies within developing countries 
are generally uncertainty avoiders (Hofstede, 1980; Chow et al., 1999).  These societies are 
governed by rules and not expectations that individuals will act appropriately by personal 
initiative and sound judgement.  Such societies also live in a collective nature and are 
perceived to be objective (Chow et al., 1999).  Management would, therefore, be discouraged 
to exercise sound professional judgement. This is also supported by William (1999), who 
believed that the low level of non-mandatory disclosure is ascribed to the high level of 
uncertainty avoidance attitude of companies in developing countries. Disclosure is conceived 
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security of companies (William, 1999), as secrecy is an important component of the business 
culture in developing countries. It could, however, also be argued that collectivism should 
result in disclosure of more information on a non-mandatory basis. This is so as the society is 
perceived to care for everyone and thus has the need to inform others. This could only be 
possible if this disclosure is not at a disadvantage of a “closer” group. The "closer" group 
entails individuals who inevitably form close links with the providers of the information, 
purely through the need to care in a collectivist society.   
Moreover, developing countries generally have feminist societies, where one does not 
prefer to be a “hero” and come into picture unnecessarily (Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1987). 
Disclosure of information on a non-mandatory basis, therefore, means doing more than 
required and hence, trying to be an “outsider” and non-co-operative. The results in this study 
showing low level of disclosure of information on a non-mandatory basis are an indication of 
this. As a result, in the case of principal based accounting standards, limited disclosure on a 
voluntary basis is expected, as the exercise of professional judgement is consistent with 
individualism and subjectivity values present within societies in developed economies.  
Hence, the results of this study question the outright adoption of International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) by developing countries. There is a need to localise the 
standards to ensure more disclosure of information on a voluntary basis to important 
stakeholders such as landowners and employees. The level of expertise within the profession, 
societal and professional cultural values does not seem to fare well with the principle based 
accounting standards of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  The findings 
of this study support the assertion that standards developed in one part of the world is not 
likely to have universal applicability. Principle based accounting standards (like IASs) would 
provide avenues for managers to disclose as little information as possible by exercising their 
judgement considering the fact that the need to legitimise ones existence is weak.   
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, important non-mandatory information is not well reported in annual reports of 
listed companies in Fiji that has almost outright adoption of IASs.  The non- mandatory 
disclosure tended to increase and decrease from period to period with no discernable trends of 
growth or otherwise being visible.  More accurate, objective and complete information is 
vital for growth in developing countries. Outright adoption of IASs is not a move in a totally 
correct direction even though the benefits of it to the multinationals are greatly 
acknowledged.  The analysis failed to confirm legitimacy theory as the primary explanation 
for non- mandatory disclosure by the Fijian companies. 
The sheer importance of an entity and management in developing countries has a lot 
of impact on what needs to be disclosed. The low to very low level of disclosure on a non-
mandatory basis in developing countries is attributed to this. Prominent entities are treated 
with respect in developing countries emanating from the level of dependence society has on 
them. These entities posses power themselves and one who associates with these entities, to 
some extent, inherits these powers. The large power distance that is established, therefore 
does not demand disclosure of any more information than necessary, thus, the low level of 
disclosure.  In such situations, only strict rules can bring about greater transparency in terms 
of sharing of information.  
The size of the reporting entity also plays an important role in the level of disclosure.  
In developing countries, due to small entities and a small capital market, low level of 
disclosure may initially be justified. There are, however, moral and ethical arguments for 
greater accountability. The common users for financial reports are well documented in 
conceptual frameworks.  
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understand what induces particular entities to voluntarily disclose non- mandatory 
information in their annual report.  Influences of society, market concentration and 
harmonisation of accounting standards have not rendered more disclosure of non- mandatory 
information than that those perceived necessary by the listed companies.  The study adds to 
our understanding of non- mandatory disclosure and represents an extension of international 
literature engaged in efforts to interpret the motives for such disclosure.  The results do not 
lend support to legitimating motives for company’s social disclosure.  Managers do not 
disclose more information than those considered necessary. 
From a theoretical perspective, it needs to be noted that concentrating on legitimacy 
theory, as an explanation for increased environmental disclosures does not suggest that other 
social theories have less explanatory power (see O’Donovon, 2002).  The imprecise 
distinction between legitimacy, stakeholder and political economy theories need to be 
continued to be examined and explicated (ibid, 2002).  Care needs to be also exercised in 
generalising too much from the results of this study.  In this study while the methods utilised 
delivered a great deal of useful quantitative data, it must be remembered that the results were 
based on 15 listed companies in Fiji’s Stock Exchange. 
Further studies using similar variables to this one from other developing countries 
would provide understanding of the extent to which these results are generalisable across 
other developing countries and industries.  In this investigation, the annual report was 
identified as the prime way corporations disseminate social and environmental information to 
various stakeholders.  One may use the methods adopted in this study to identify how other 
means of communication are utilised in managing legitimacy (e.g. O’Donovan, 2002).   
O’Donovan (2002), for example, identifies the effect that the publication of stand alone 
environmental reports and use of the World Wide Web has on the quantity and quality of 
annual reports disclosure and choice of legitimating tactics in an area which appears timely to 
research further.   
Research that investigates the impact of various forms of media on corporate social 
disclosure would also be a contribution to the literature (see Deegan et al., 2002).  Media 
have also emphasised greatly to specific environmental issues like depletion of ozone 
activities with specific types of corporate environmental disclosures.  Future research may 
also like to consider the usage of media articles in driving environmental disclosures, and 
possibly the association between them.   
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Table 1: Average Location of Non-mandatory Disclosures in Listed Companies  
Annual Reports from 1999 – 2002. 
 
 Location of Non-mandatory  
Disclosure  1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002  2002-  2003 
General 12%  8%  11%  9% 
Chairman’s 63%  65%  62%  65% 
Chief Executive’s  25%  27%  27%  26% 
 
Figure 1: Level of disclosure over the four years 
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Figure 2: Total Assets over the four years 































Table 2: Spearman Correlations between level of non-mandatory disclosure and the 
firm size. 
YEAR  R  r
2 
 
2002-2003 0.569137  0.323917 
 
2001-2002 0.618926  0.383069 
 
2000-2001 0.535786  0.287067 
 
1999-2000 0.666892  0.444745 
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Figure 3: Return on Assets over the four years 































Table 3: Spearman Correlations between level of non-mandatory disclosure and firm 
performance 
YEAR   r   r
2 
 
2002-2003 0.02851  0.000813 
 
2001-2002 -0.07486  0.005604 
 
2000-2001 -0.22509  0.050666 
 
1999-2000 -0.2973  0.088386 
 
AVERAGE -0.14218  0.036367 
 
**End of Paper** 
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